




Dutch constitutional law in a globalizing world






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van der Schyff, G., & Meuwese, A. (2013). Dutch constitutional law in a globalizing world. Utrecht Law Review,
9(2), 1-6.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Editorial
1
Dutch Constitutional Law in a Globalizing World
Gerhard van der Schyff
Anne Meuwese*
http://www.utrechtlawreview.org | Volume 9, Issue 2 (March) 2013 | URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-112924 |            
In an era of the ‘globalization of constitutional law’, characterized by trends such as a revival of formal 
constitution-making and the rise of constitutional review as a ‘must have’ for constitutional democracies, 
the case of the constitutional order of the Netherlands stands out. In an apparent contrast, the country is 
known for having a monist legal order that is open to external influences, yet is one of the last bulwarks 
to maintain a prohibition on constitutional review by the judiciary. This means that while the courts are 
prohibited from applying the Constitution to any Act of Parliament, they are enjoined to review every 
Act of Parliament for compatibility with provisions of international law that are ‘binding on everyone’. 
The doctrine of monism is so deeply rooted in the country’s legal culture that all national law, including 
the Constitution, is seen as being hierarchically inferior to international law.1 This attachment to monism 
also explains why the Netherlands has not been confronted with constitutional headaches as to the 
relationship between (national) constitutional law and European Union law to the extent that many 
other European jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, have. After all, the stance that 
binding provisions of international law automatically – i.e. as international law, without further domestic 
implementation – become part of the Dutch legal order is well internalized. As ingrained as monism is 
to Dutch legal practice and culture, so too is the bar on constitutional review that has been present in 
the Constitution (Grondwet) ever since 1848, having survived every constitutional revision to date. This 
feature of the country’s constitutional law is as important to understanding the national legal order as 
monism is to understanding the country’s place in Europe and beyond. The bar on review is central to 
studying the role and nature of the Constitution, its interpretation as well as the relationship between the 
courts and the legislature. 
Interestingly, not only the bar on constitutional review is regulated in the Constitution; so too is the 
doctrine of monism, providing both ‘golden rules’ with a constitutional foundation. While Article 120 
of the Constitution prohibits the courts from ruling on the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, 
Article 93 provides that provisions of treaties and of decisions by international organizations that can bind 
everyone in view of their content become binding after publication. Article 94 adds to this by codifying 





1	 M.C.	 Burkens	 et	 al.,	Beginselen van de democratische rechtsstaat,	 2012,	 p.	 91.	 The	 doctrine	 of	 the	 ‘automatic’	 domestic	 effect	 of	
international	law	was	laid	down	by	the	Dutch	Supreme	Court	(Hoge Raad)	in	1919	in	Grenstraktaat Aken,	HR	3	March	1919,	NJ	1919,	317.
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so far as such legislation conflicts with binding international law.2 In recent years both the amendment 
or abolition of Article 120 and the desired scope of Article 94 have been the object of intense political 
and academic debate.3 This raises a number of questions, such as why the possibility of review has not 
been introduced to date and whether the Constitution is capable of being judicially reviewed. However, 
as the written Constitution is rather difficult to amend, change has to come from doctrine, practice and 
informal mechanisms. Building on previous publications about Dutch constitutional law in English,4 the 
contributions to this special issue of the Utrecht Law Review explore different facets of the paradox of 
an open constitutional order with a reluctance to make the Constitution as such judicially enforceable. 
The various articles provide insights into the national and international factors that influence the 
constitutional order of the Netherlands, thereby helping to test assumptions in the international literature 
regarding the universality of certain constitutional principles and mechanisms. The contributions were 
discussed during a workshop held at Tilburg University on 14 September 2012 and some contributions, 
such as those by Van der Schyff, Mak and De Poorter, are based in part on presentations delivered at 
the annual conference of the Association of Constitutional Law of the Netherlands that took place on 
3 December 2010.5 
Gerhard van der Schyff is the first author to tackle the evergreen problem of Dutch constitutional law as 
to whether constitutional review by the judiciary should be introduced or not. While the merits of this 
question have, and still are, hotly debated, little attention has been paid to whether the Constitution is also 
ripe for review should the prohibition on review in Article 120 of the Constitution be lifted or amended. 
Van der Schyff focuses in particular on the formulation of the various specific limitation provisions 
in the first chapter of the Constitution, its bill of rights, as most proposals to introduce constitutional 
review usually argue for a (partial) lifting of the ban with respect to applying fundamental rights. The 
view is defended that the current approach is not entirely adequate and that it should be remedied by 
introducing a general limitation provision that regulates not only the formal but also the substantive 
criteria in justifying interferences with the protective scopes of rights. In this regard the report in 2010 
by the State Commission on Constitutional Reform (Staatscommissie Grondwet) is supported in the 
contribution, albeit in a qualified manner, as disagreement exists as to the optimal formulation of such a 
general provision to ensure a meaningful dialogue between the legislature and the courts in deciding on 
the acceptable extent to which rights may be limited.6
While Van der Schyff focuses on the implications of following the global trend to introduce constitutional 
review by the judiciary, Leonard Besselink explores how Europeanization, as a subspecies of globalization, 
affects the conduct and organization of judicial review in the Netherlands. Given the effect of Article 94 
of the Constitution, which regulates treaty review, and the fact that the courts in the Netherlands apply 
European Union law on account of the law’s inherent monism, the important question is posed as to 
what the real mandate of courts in the country is. Do the courts in the Netherlands enjoy a national, 
international or European mandate, and to what extent do they possess these different mandates?7 The 
contribution shows that the role of the courts in a legal system such as that in the Netherlands can in 
essence undermine a national democratic mandate by overruling or refusing to apply the Constitution 
2	 For	an	overview	of	the	position	in	terms	of	Arts.	120	and	94	of	the	Constitution,	see	J.	Uzman,	‘The	Dutch	Supreme	Court:	A	Reluctant	
Positive	Legislator’,	in	A.R.	Brewer-Carías	(ed.),	Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law Study,	2011,	p.	645.
3	 For	the	most	recent	legislative	proposal	to	amend	the	bar	in	Art.	120	of	the	Constitution,	see	Kamerstukken II,	2001/02,	28	331,	no.	2.	
The	bill	is	commonly	referred	to	as	the	‘Halsema	bill’,	in	recognition	of	Femke	Halsema,	the	Member	of	Parliament	who	tabled	the	bill.
4	 See	 e.g.,	 C.	 Ryngaert,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Human	 Rights	 in	 the	 Dutch	 Legal	 Order’,	 in	 R.	 Arnold	 (ed.),	The Universalism of Human Rights,	
16	IUS	Gentium,	2012,	p.	237;	L.F.M.	Besselink,	Constitutional Law of the Netherlands,	2004;	C.A.J.M.	Kortmann	&	P.P.T.	Bovend’Eert,	
The Kingdom of the Netherlands: An Introduction to Dutch Constitutional Law,	2007;	G.	van	der	Schyff,	 ‘Constitutional	review	by	the	
judiciary	in	the	Netherlands:	A	bridge	too	far?’,	2010	German Law Journal 11,	pp.	275-290;	M.	Adams	&	G.	van	der	Schyff,	‘Constitutional	
review	by	the	judiciary	in	the	Netherlands:	A	matter	of	politics,	democracy	or	compensating	strategy?’,	2006	Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht	66,	p.	399;	G.	van	der	Schyff,	Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, 
The Netherlands and South Africa,	2010.
5	 For	a	collection	of	the	proceedings	in	Dutch,	see	A.	Kristic	et	al.	(eds.),	Functie en betekenis van de Grondwet: een dialogisch perspectief,	
2011.
6	 Rapport Staatscommissie Grondwet,	2010.
7	 On	the	topic	of	courts’	mandates,	see	also	M.	Claes,	The National Courts’ Mandates in the European Constitution,	2006.
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in giving effect to superior supranational legal norms, raising a host of questions. Besselink also shows 
that the requirements of the European constitutional constellation are such that ordinary national courts 
increasingly fulfil a decidedly constitutional role, even though courts such as the Supreme Court (Hoge 
Raad) and the Council of State (Raad van State) in the Netherlands do not qualify as typical constitutional 
benches on a traditional reading. Extrapolating the experience of the Netherlands, or rather putting the 
Dutch case forward as evidence, the general claim is also defended that the centralized organization of 
constitutional review, which is so typical of many European jurisdictions, is increasingly coming under 
pressure given the necessary decentralized elements that are occasioned by the fact that EU law requires 
all courts to give effect to the primacy of such law.
Globalization obviously has many faces. While Besselink focuses on how Europeanization impacts on 
the mandate of national courts, Elaine Mak explores the equally important question of courts, across 
jurisdictions, learning from each other by comparing points of law.8 Courts in many civil law systems 
have traditionally been wary of comparison, probably because of the fact that the law as a codified source 
encouraged its application to be viewed as an exercise in syllogism and deduction and not so much as 
something that is also influenced and shaped by judicial interpretation. In her contribution, Mak notes 
that such an insular and technical attitude is increasingly something of the past because of the influence 
of globalization. She examines the changing practices of the highest courts in the Netherlands, in 
particular the Supreme Court and the Council of State in this regard. On the basis of an empirical study 
she clarifies how Dutch judges perceive the usefulness of legal comparison and how foreign law is used in 
deliberations and judgments. The constitutional implications of the changing practices of the courts are 
also analyzed in light of three aspects of the constitutional normative framework for judicial decision-
making, namely the democratic justification of judicial decisions, legal traditions and the nature of cases 
as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of judicial decision-making. The contribution concludes by 
highlighting legal comparison as a source of legal interpretation in the Netherlands, but based only on 
the persuasive nature of foreign material, while still respecting Dutch law as the primary basis for court 
rulings.
Globalization is by its very nature not self-contained, as the concept’s very existence depends on the 
interaction or even the merger of various components to form a global approach or entity. The contribution 
of Hans Gribnau nicely illustrates the global effect on the local in this respect. Gribnau investigates the 
consequence of the bar on the constitutional review of Acts of Parliament by the judiciary in Article 120 
of the Constitution using equality in tax law as a case study. Gribnau illustrates the phenomenon that 
because of this bar, the courts turn to international law and in particular Article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in ensuring that tax law is administered on a basis that respects 
equality. Equality, in tax law cases in the Netherlands, is an international value that is protected by the 
national courts, at the expense even of constitutional guarantees of equality one might be tempted to 
conclude. Although international law might be a source for equal protection, Gribnau’s analysis of the 
case law shows that the courts in the country are at times too reticent in giving full effect to equality as 
a norm of higher law.9 At times the courts only point to a protection deficit, while refusing to order a 
legal remedy, or only warn the state that the courts will undertake remedial action if the state does not 
protect equality in a more substantive sense. While globalization creates an opportunity to turn to the 
international legal order to solve a national problem, the distance perceived by the national courts from 
such international norms might fuel an, at times, unnecessary reticence in protecting a value such as 
equality.
The role that treaty review in Article 94 of the Constitution plays as a means through which to 
compensate the bar on constitutional review in Article 120 is also to be found in the contribution of Nick 
Efthymiou and Joke de Wit. While Hans Gribnau, although not uncritical, lauds the Supreme Court 
8	 Compare	also	E.	Mak,	‘Why	do	Dutch	and	UK	Judges	Cite	Foreign	Law?’,	2011	Cambridge Law Journal	70,	p.	420.
9	 In	this	regard,	see	Gribnau’s	reference	to	HR	(Supreme	Court)	12	July	2002,	BNB	2002/399-400,	among	cases.
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for protecting equality via the international law route and advocates an attitude which is even more 
open to such influence, Efthymiou and De Wit show that political winds question and even threaten the 
open character of the Constitution of the Netherlands to international law. Academic voices calling for 
national courts to fulfil a greater role in treaty review by taking ownership of the norms that they apply, 
are matched by calls from some Members of Parliament calling for the country’s monist disposition to 
international law to be traded in for dualism.10 In other words, international norms should in the dualist 
view first be incorporated into national law through an Act of Parliament before the courts are competent 
to apply such norms, much like the position in Germany and the United Kingdom. Were this to happen, 
a consequence would be to place a national parliamentary check on the effect to be given to international 
law in the national legal order, thereby checking the country’s open attitude to international law and 
globalization by implication. The question posed by Leonard Besselink as to the mandate of Dutch 
courts would become somewhat less complicated if the courts’ national role would be stressed in this 
manner. The question, though, is whether replacing monism with dualism would deliver an acceptable 
constitutional fit in the Netherlands, as the country’s constitutional tradition usually perceives of the 
‘national’ as but a component of the country’s composite legal order. 
On the institutional front, the question can be posed how the courts should be structured were the bullet 
to be bitten and constitutional review of Acts of Parliament by the judiciary would be introduced in the 
Netherlands. In his contribution Jurgen de Poorter examines this question against the background of the 
role of the Council of State in giving advice to Parliament on constitutional matters. De Poorter concludes 
that a constitutional court in the Netherlands is attractive for many reasons, but that caution is also called 
for.11 He links the introduction of such a court to engaging in a dialogue with the political branches in 
the form of the legislature and the executive, but reminds us that the equality of the partners should be 
respected in order for such a dialogue to be meaningful. For example, if the legitimacy of the legislature 
and the executive is reduced, the pressure on the judiciary to offer a counterweight to this reduction will 
increase. This is an understandable reaction but it should not be allowed to lead to a distraction from 
the real problem of securing democratic legitimacy in the first place. De Poorter also notes that such an 
imbalance might damage the legitimacy of the judiciary by over-exercising its review function. To avoid 
such a scenario from developing the legislature must invest sufficiently in guaranteeing the constitutional 
quality of the laws it enacts. One way in which this can be achieved is to establish a special parliamentary 
committee to rule on the constitutionality or conformity of proposed legislation with treaties, similar to 
the British Joint Committee on Human Rights. 
Looking beyond the development of the constitutional role of the judiciary, the primacy of the legislature 
is another salient feature under pressure in the Dutch constitutional landscape. This feature is closely 
related to the fact that courts in the country have been prohibited from conducting constitutional review 
since the nineteenth century. In his contribution Rob van Gestel argues that there is ample reason to 
reconsider the current constitutional embedding of the idea of the primacy of the national legislature 
given the influence of globalizing trends, especially in the context of the European Union. This need 
for rethinking is brought about by the fact that framework laws are on the rise both at the European 
and the national level and threaten to overstretch the ‘transmission belt theory’ on delegation. This 
normative theory stipulates that the legitimacy of secondary legislation, agency rule-making, self-
regulation and co-regulation needs to be linked to parliamentary involvement. As European and national 
legislation are becoming more and more intertwined, determining whether the centre of gravity for 
democratic legitimacy should lie with the European Union, the national parliament or perhaps with a 
more institutionalised cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments becomes 
increasingly difficult. Moreover, law-making by executive bodies, independent administrative agencies 




A	Comparative	and	European	Perspective’,	2012	European Journal of Law Reform 14,	p.	467.
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and private rule makers both at the national and the EU level has taken such a high flight that one may 
wonder whether or not it threatens democracy and hence the primacy of the Dutch legislature. As an 
answer to these developments Van Gestel argues the case for three ways which could accommodate 
the primacy of the legislature, and so respect its democratic legitimacy. First, the idea of constituting 
a European Senate is aired, which would be designed to increase the influence of national legislatures 
at the European level.12 Second, the idea to accept the increase in delegated legislation but to subject 
such legislation to clear procedural rules in combination with judicial review is explored. The final idea 
aired by Van Gestel is to rely more on substantive framework legislation but with conditions for private 
rule-making. The contribution clearly shows that although on the increase, Europeanizing the legislative 
process does not have to mean, and should probably not mean, that national democratic legitimacy is to 
be left by the wayside. 
The final contribution, by Anne Meuwese and Marnix Snel, deals with a theoretical device often employed 
to grasp the increasing interaction between legal orders and actors brought about by the globalization 
of law: constitutional ‘dialogue’. They present a structured overview of the large, diverse and growing 
literature dealing with this subject.13 Special attention is paid to newer applications of ‘constitutional 
dialogues’, to communications between actors beyond courts and legislatures. Engaging the citizen in 
public decision-making is an increasingly important – if still often implicit – aim in dialogue theories. 
The contribution offers some handles regarding different uses of ‘constitutional dialogue’ for anyone 
who considers making use of this device. Also in Dutch constitutional debates, ‘dialogue’ is an attractive 
solution when formal changes seem too rigorous or counter-productive, but one that we need to get 
concrete about. 
The Dutch constitutional order has long provided a salient case study of a system open to external 
influences coupled with the anomaly of a prohibition of constitutional review. Now that globalization 
puts pressure on classical institutions and traditional constitutional mechanisms, heightened debates on 
the right balance between international or even ‘global’ public law and ‘domestic’ constitutional law turn 
the constitutional reality of the Netherlands into an even more valuable test case. The contributions to 
this special issue each tackle a specific challenge to the Dutch constitutional order and propose options 
for going forward in adapting a dual-faceted Constitution to an increasingly complex, interdependent 
and integrated world.
12	 For	instance,	Van	Gestel	discusses	the	proposal	by	G.	van	der	Schyff	&	G.J.	Leenknegt,	‘The	Case	for	a	European	Senate.	A	Model	for	the	
Representation	of	National	Parliaments	in	the	European	Union’,	2007	Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht,	p.	237.
13	 For	example,	reference	is	made	to	the	work	of	T.R.S.	Allan,	‘Constitutional	Dialogue	and	the	Justification	of	Judicial	Review’,	2003	Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies	23,	p.	563;	C. Bateup,	‘The	Dialogic	Promise	–	Assessing	the	Normative	Potential	of	Theories	of	Constitutional	
Dialogue’,	2006	Brooklyn Law Review	71,	p.	1109,	among	many	other	authors.
